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I.  INTRODUCTION 
334–324 B.C. 
Alexander . . . looked upon himself as the carrier of Greek 
civilisation. . . .  Around 200 B.C. a man could speak Greek from 
the Gates of Hercules to the Ganges. . . .  The science, philosophy 
and, above all, the art of the Greeks was thus coming to bear on the 
old civilisations of the East.  Coins, vases, architectural and 
sculptural remains and, . . . literary influences, bear witness to this 
cultural invasion. . . .1 
Late 1980s–Early 1990s 
[S]enior members of three distinct corporate cultures had agreed to 
the globalization of . . . “fundamental principles” of intellectual 
property. . . .  Implicit . . . was . . . a morality of investment in 
information . . . . Piracy would have to be eliminated, infringement 
. . . criminalized . . . severe limits [placed] on public interest 
exceptions . . . [and agreement] to become the subjects of 
meaningful enforcement procedures if [countries] did not 
comply . . .2  
Like Alexander’s empire, TRIPs3 has undoubtedly spread Western principles 
across the globe.4  Does this necessarily mean, however, that TRIPs has 
perpetuated a “new empire”—that it is “imperialistic”?5  The “new empire” 
would be as intangible as Alexander’s was short lived.6  It would subsist not by 
maintaining armies and grabbing land, but by imposing a system of norms and 
values upon other cultures in order to gain and advance protection for the 
empire’s major asset—intellectual property.  Over millennia, the West developed 
                                                                                                                                     
1 BERTRAND RUSSELL, WISDOM OF THE WEST 102–03 (Paul Foulkes ed.) (1959) (discussing 
Alexander the Great’s empire within a greater discussion of the Hellenistic world). 
2 PETER DRAHOS WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 123 (2002) (noting the three cultures as the U.S., the EC, and Japan). 
3 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 269, 
33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/ 
legal_e/27-trips.pdf.  
4 See generally DRAHOS, supra note 2, at 108–49. 
5 Perhaps the “Emperor” of the “new empire” might actually be more like a “Lord” in a feudal 
sense such as Drahos and Braithwaite explain with their concept of “information feudalism,” the 
“emergent property right” of which is defined as “[i]nfogopolies, biogopolies over abstract 
objects.”  See DRAHOS, supra note 2, at 199. 
6 See RUSSELL, supra note 1, at 103 (discussing the ephemeral nature of Alexander’s empire 
after his death). 
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distinct conceptions of philosophy, science, literature, art, music, and economics.7  
These conceptions8 led to value-laden constructions of protection for intellectual 
property.9  At the same time, world cultures developed distinct paradigms and 
came to view intellectual property in different ways.10  Today, however, a global 
economy and a shrinking world demand solutions for consistent protection of 
intellectual property on an international scale.  One major effort to satisfy this 
need is TRIPs. 
TRIPs is often lauded as a wonder treaty—a marvel that provides, for the first 
time ever, an enforcement mechanism with “teeth.”11  To say that TRIPs has been 
well accepted by many would be an understatement.12  Nonetheless, TRIPs has 
critics.13  They seem to assert that TRIPs is merely a form of Western 
Imperialism—a vehicle for spreading the West’s cultural ideals and economic 
interests at the expense of less-industrialized, non-Western nations.14 
                                                                                                                                     
7 See generally RUSSELL, supra note 1 (providing a concise survey of “Western thought”). 
8 One of the most relevant constructs is the West’s concept of “property.”  See DONALD G. 
RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 25–52 (2004) (outlining various philosophic interpretations 
of “property” and explaining that the concept of “exclusivity” applies most aptly to intellectual 
property). 
9 Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
10 xxSee, e.g., Geoffrey T. Willard, An Examination of China’s Emerging Intellectual 
Property Regime: Historical Underpinnings, The Current System and Prospects for the Future, 6 
IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 411, 411–28 (1996) (discussing Chinese intellectual property concepts 
over time).  China recognized some forms of intellectual property nearly 3,000 years ago during 
the Zhou Dynasty.  Id. at 413.  As the communists took power, intellectual property was grounded 
“[o]n the notion that individual accomplishments belonged to all of society.”  Id. at 417. 
11 Robert J. Pechman, Seeking Multilateral Protection for Intellectual Property: The United 
States “Trips” over Special 301, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 179, 187–88 (1998) (discussing how 
TRIPs provides a mechanism which provides actual consequences).  See TRIPs, supra note 3, art. 
64.  
12 See, e.g., DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY & ANALYSIS 3 
(3rd ed. 2008) (opining that along with the 1968 Stockholm Conference that created WIPO, TRIPs 
“[i]s undoubtedly the most significant milestone in the development of [intellectual property] in 
the twentieth century”). 
13 See, e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT & POLICY OPTIONS 3 (2000) (“Developing 
countries reluctantly negotiated increased standards of protection for IPRs in GATT, and finally 
acquiesced in making important concessions in terms of reforms of their intellectual property 
legislation, without obtaining any compensating concession from industrialized countries.”). 
14 See BANKOLE SODIPO, PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING: GATT, TRIPS & DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 276 (1997) (explaining that because of the manner of introduction and administration, 
“the system is viewed [by developing countries] mainly as a vehicle for protecting foreign 
interests”). 
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This article asserts that TRIPs is far more than a tool for the perpetuation of a 
“new empire.”  It asserts that TRIPs is not imperialistic for three reasons.15  First, 
the spirit of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (“DSM”) provisions in the 
developing countries’ draft agreement text subsists in subsequent drafts, the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”),16 and in the disposition of a majority 
of TRIPs disputes.17  Second, TRIPs stifles Special 301-type unilateralism.18  
Third, strong empirical evidence shows that TRIPs’ third-party DSM participation 
is diverse, extensive, and has increased over time.19 
II.  “WESTERN IMPERIALISM” DEFINED 
For purposes of this article, “Western” does not necessarily mean Western 
in a purely geographic sense, because Japan also advocated inclusion of 
intellectual property rights in the Uruguay Round of GATT.20  As such, to some 
extent the label “Western” is a collective term for three industrialized political 
bodies situated in both the West and the Far East.  This construct comes with 
a caveat, however, because Japan’s stance was at times quite divergent from 
the stance of the United States and the European Communities (“EC”) during 
TRIPs’ formation.21  Moreover, during TRIPs negotiations, the public-private 
relationship in Japan appears to have resulted in the Japanese business community 
playing a far less forceful role than that of its American and European 
counterparts.22  Indeed, some view Japan’s role as rather passive.23  Accordingly, 
the term “Western,” as used in this article, primarily means the United States, the 
EC, and to a lesser extent, Japan.  
                                                                                                                                     
15 See infra Part II.  This article focuses solely on TRIPs’ dispute settlement mechanism 
(“DSM”).  Although some may interpret other aspects of TRIPs as “imperialistic,” TRIPs is not 
imperialistic overall because the DSM is a central aspect. 
16 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].   
17 See infra Part III.A. 
18 See infra Part III.B. 
19 See infra Part IV. 
20 See M.B. RAO & MANJULA GURO, UNDERSTANDING TRIPS: MANAGING KNOWLEDGE IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 13 (2003).  GATT refers to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
21 See Mitsuo Matsushita, A Japanese Perspective on Intellectual Property Rights & the 
GATT, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81 (1992) (discussing Japan’s divergent views on a number of 
issues). 
22 See DRAHOS, supra note 2, at 117 (“[T]he relentless search for consensus meant that 
Japanese businesses and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) never operated 
too far apart from each other, making it difficult for Japanese business to take the kind of agenda-
setting role that US business played.”). 
23 See DRAHOS, supra note 2, at 118 (“[T]he Japanese simply sat back, watching and waiting 
for others to take the lead.”). 
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“Imperialistic,” as used in this article, means imperialistic in the broad sense 
of the term.24  Therefore, the reader should interpret “imperialistic” as “the 
extension or imposition of power, authority, or influence” of a nation or group 
over another nation or group.25 
III.  TRIPS IS NOT IMPERIALISTIC, BECAUSE ITS DSM REFLECTS 
THE SPIRIT OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ DRAFT AGREEMENT 
TEXT, AND REPRESENTS A SHIFT AWAY FROM UNILATERALISM 
TRIPs’ DSM is not imperialistic.  First, its design and application reflect the 
spirit of the developing countries’ draft agreement text, and second, it is a 
Western-driven shift away from Special 301-type unilateralism.26  Although the 
intricacies of Special 301 are beyond this article’s scope, a brief discussion may 
be helpful for the sections below.27  Special 301 requires that the United States 
Trade Representative (“USTR”) identify “priority foreign countries” (“PFCs”)—
those countries that “deny adequate and effective [intellectual property] 
protection” or “deny fair and equitable market access” to United States companies 
that rely on such protection.28  If, after a period of investigation and publication,29 
the most “egregious” PFCs do not enter into good faith negotiations or “make 
significant progress in bilateral or multilateral negotiations,” then the PFC may 
face unilateral retaliation through the processes available through “regular” 
section 301.30  
A. TRIPs’ Dispute Mechanism Facilitates Developing Countries’ Goals 
TRIPs is not imperialistic, because its DSM’s design and application reflect 
the spirit of developing countries’ draft agreement text despite the near wholesale 
incorporation of the West’s draft agreement text into the final version of TRIPs. 
                                                                                                                                     
24 “Imperialistic” is defined as “the policy, practice, or advocacy of extending the power and 
dominion of a nation especially by direct territorial acquisitions or by gaining indirect control over 
the political or economic life of other areas; broadly: the extension or imposition of power, 
authority, or influence.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 623 (11th ed. 2003). 
25 Id. 
26 Trade Act of 1974, § 182, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 1999, § 141 (1974) (amended 
by Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1179, 
§ 1303) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2006)).  See generally infra Part III. 
27 For a more detailed discussion of Special 301, see Lina M. Montén, Comment, The 
Inconsistency Between Section 301 & TRIPS: Counterproductive with Respect to the Future of 
International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights?, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 387 
(2005). 
28 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a) (2006). 
29 For example, the USTR’s “2009 Special 301 Report” was recently published.  Office of the 
United States Trade Representative, 2009 Special 301 Report, (Apr. 30, 2009), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Full Version of the 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT.pdf.   
30 See 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)-(e); Montén, supra note 27, at 400–03. 
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A DSM derived from divergent viewpoints, while primarily facially 
incorporative of one viewpoint’s text, is not imperialistic if the design and 
application of that mechanism reflect the spirit of other parties’ viewpoints.  As 
such, one must look beyond the text of TRIPs as it stands today when determining 
whether it is imperialistic.  To determine whether the “spirit” of the developing 
countries’ draft agreement text subsisted past the negotiating table, one must 
compare the early versions of the developing countries’ draft with those from the 
West, trace it through subsequent working drafts and the final version of TRIPs, 
and then examine whether this “spirit” survives through TRIPs’ body of 
complaints to date. 
TRIPs’ formation is somewhat shrouded in mystery.31  Indeed, one account 
holds that TRIPs was essentially formed by a group of only fifty people.32 
Thankfully, however, early draft agreement texts from various viewpoints are 
available to analyze.33  During TRIPs negotiations, the West and the developing 
countries had disparate views over the prospective shape of TRIPs’ DSM.  On one 
hand, the West wanted to incorporate GATT’s dispute settlement process into 
TRIPs.34  On the other hand, developing countries sought mutually satisfactory 
solutions as opposed to an adversarial process.35  For example, part of the EC’s 
text states the following: 
Contracting parties agree that . . . they shall, in relation to each 
other, abide by the dispute settlement rules and procedures of 
[GATT], and the recommendations, rulings and decisions of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES, and not have recourse in relation to 
                                                                                                                                     
31 See DRAHOS, supra note 2, at 10. 
32 See Id.  “During the course of an interview in 1994 with a senior US trade negotiator he 
remarked to us that ‘probably less than 50 people were responsible for TRIPS.”  Id.  
33 For an especially detailed analysis of various TRIPs documents, see GERVAIS, supra note 
12. 
34 MICHAEL BLAKENEY, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A 
CONCISE GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 140 (1996) (citing Communication from the European 
Community, Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, GATT Doc. No. 
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/68 (March 29, 1990) [hereinafter EC Draft Agreement (W/68)]).  Documents 
from India, Australia, the Nordic Countries, and Switzerland preceded Document W/68; however, 
W/68 “could be considered the spark which ignited the work towards the TRIPs agreement.”  
GERVAIS, supra note 12, at 16–17 n.61.  Japan and Switzerland also tabled proposals in mid-May 
1990.  GERVAIS, supra note 12, at 17 nn. 63–64. 
35 GERVAIS, supra note 12, at 17 (citing Communication from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and Uruguay, GATT Doc. No. 
MTN.GNG/NG11/71 (May 14, 1990) [hereinafter Developing Countries’ Draft Agreement 
(W/71)]). 
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other contracting parties to unilaterally decided economic 
measures of any kind.36 
After the EC released Document W/68, the United States soon followed with 
a nearly identical text.37  The United States added nothing to the EC’s dispute 
resolution language.38  Part of the developing countries’ proposal stated the 
following:  
Article 19: Consultations.  (1) Where a dispute arises concerning 
the interpretation or implementation of any provisions of this 
Agreement, a Party may bring the matter to the attention of another 
Party and request the latter to enter into consultations with it.  (2) 
The Party so requested shall provide promptly an adequate 
opportunity for the requested consultations.  (3) Parties engaged in 
consultations shall attempt to reach, within a reasonable period of 
time, a mutually satisfactory solution to the dispute. 
Article 20: Other Means of Settlement.  If a mutually satisfactory 
solution is not reached within a reasonable period of time through 
the consultations referred to in Article 19, Parties to the dispute 
may agree to resort to other means designed to lead to an amicable 
settlement of their dispute, such as good offices, conciliation, 
mediation and arbitration. 
Article 21: Non-recourse to Unilateral Measures.  Parties shall 
refrain, in relation to each other, from threatening or having 
recourse to unilaterally decided measures of any kind aimed at 
ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights. 39 
Therefore, very early on, and just two years after the adoption of Special 
301,40 the United States, the EC, and the developing countries agreed on the 
rejection of unilateral retaliation as part of TRIPs’ DSM.41  With the then-rising 
                                                                                                                                     
36 EC Draft Agreement (W/68), supra note 34, at pt. 5, art. 8 available at http://docsonline. 
wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (type “mtn.gng/ng11/w/68” into search field under 
“full text search criteria” and then preview result in HTML mode). 
37 See GERVAIS supra note 12, at 17 (“The similarity between the two documents suggested 
that transatlantic consultations had preceded the tabling of both documents.”). 
38 Communication from the United States, Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property, GATT Doc. No. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70 (May 11, 1990) (stating that 
the U.S. believes the EC’s provisions “provide in general an acceptable basis for 
negotiation”), at Part IV, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode= 
simple (type “mtn.gng/ng11/w/70” into search field under “full text search criteria” and then 
preview result in HTML mode). 
39 Developing Countries’ Draft Agreement (W/71), supra note 35, at ch. IX, arts. 19–21. 
40 See supra note 26 (citing the 1988 amendment to the Trade Act of 1974).  
41 See supra notes 36, 38–39 and accompanying text. 
7
Noss: In Defense of TRIPs: It Only Seems Imperialistic
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
[1:154 2010] Note: In Defense of TRIPs, It Only Seems Imperialistic 161 
threat of Special 301, the developing countries’ avoidance of unilateralism in 
TRIPs was undoubtedly of paramount concern.42  TRIPs’ anti-imperialistic effect 
is evident through a strong connection between the state of TRIPs’ formation and 
the United States’ deployment of Special 301.  For example, in 1989 and 1990, 
the USTR labeled no countries “Priority Foreign Countries,” but when TRIPs 
negotiations stalled in 1991, it quickly designated China, India, and Thailand as 
such.43 
Shortly after the various drafts were submitted, the Council of Representatives 
Chairman provided a report to the group.44  Although its structure was most 
similar to the EC’s and United States’ drafts, “by and large it was eventually 
accepted as the basis for further discussions.”45  The Chairman’s report clearly 
presented two approaches: (1) the West’s all-encompassing agreement approach; 
and (2) the developing countries’ demarcated approach.46  Thus, disagreement 
still existed.47  Nonetheless, the voice of the developing countries was still 
present.48 
Eventually, the West’s single-agreement approach was adopted, as can be 
seen in Article 64 of TRIPs.49  Article 64 incorporates the DSU and GATT 
1994.50  As discussed above, the developing countries wanted the mechanism to 
involve consultations that led to “mutually satisfactory solution[s]” in a 
reasonable time.51  Moreover, the developing countries felt that parties should fall 
back on use of “good offices, conciliation, mediation and arbitration” and should 
                                                                                                                                     
42 In 1989, the USTR placed twenty-five countries on its “watch list.”  See Pechman, supra 
note 11, at 197. 
43 See Pechman, supra note 11, at 197. 
44 GERVAIS, supra note 12, at 18–19; Chairman’s report to the Group of Negotiation of 
Goods, GATT Doc. No. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 (July 27, 1990), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/ gen_search.asp? searchmode= imple (type “mtn.gng/ng11/w/76” into 
search field under “full text search criteria” and then preview result in HTML mode) [hereafter 
Chairman’s Report (W/76)]. 
45 See GERVAIS, supra note 12, at 20. 
46 See id. at 19–20 (noting that the developing countries sought to have pirated and 
counterfeited goods under a GATT model, and a separate non-GATT agreement regarding 
intellectual property rights more generally). 
47 See GERVAIS supra note 12, at 23 (“[t]here were three possible avenues: a completely 
separate dispute settlement mechanism for TRIPs; a system under the (future) WTO umbrella but 
without the possibility of cross-retaliation; or, as a last option, full incorporation into the WTO 
mechanism.”). 
48 See Chairman’s Report (W/76), supra note 44, Part IV. 
49 See TRIPs, supra note 3, art. 64. 
50 GERVAIS supra note 12, at 508; TRIPs, supra note 3, art. 64 (incorporating GATT 1947, 
supra note 20, art. XXII and XXIII (as amended by GATT 1994)); DSU, supra note 16. 
51 Developing Countries’ Draft Agreement (W/71), supra note 35, art. 19. 
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always refrain from unilateral recourse.52  A close look at the DSU reveals that 
the spirit of the developing countries’ draft agreement text was not totally lost 
despite the adoption of the West’s single-agreement approach. 
First, DSU Article 3 states that “[a] solution mutually acceptable to the parties 
to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be 
preferred.”53  Second, DSU Article 5 states that “[g]ood offices, conciliation or 
mediation may be requested at any time by any party to a dispute.  They may 
begin at any time and be terminated at any time.”54  Moreover, Article 5 provides 
that parties may continue with these options during the panel process.55  In 
addition, the Director-General may even offer such options.56  Lastly, DSU 
Article 23, titled “Strengthening of the Multilateral System,” calls for Members to 
“abide by[ ] the rules and procedures of the [DSU],” and, in particular, refers to 
Article 22.57  Article 22 lays the groundwork for the suspension of concessions or 
other obligations.58  It provides a clear preference for same-sector sanctions, and 
only allows a Member to request cross-sector sanctions when a number of factors 
are met.59 
Lastly, TRIPs is not imperialistic, because the application of its DSM reflects 
the spirit of the developing countries’ draft agreement text.  As discussed above, 
the developing countries primarily sought “mutually satisfactory solution[s].”60  
Therefore, to the extent that TRIPs’ DSM has yielded mutually satisfactory 
solutions, it reflects the spirit of the developing countries’ goal.  To the extent it 
reflects the developing countries’ goal, TRIPs is not imperialistic. 
Thirteen of the twenty-five TRIPs disputes between 1996 and 2009, or 52%, 
ended with a Mutually Agreed Solution.61  Notably, of the thirteen disputes with 
Mutually Agreed Solutions, the United States was the complainant twelve times, 
or over 92% of the time.62  Thus, of the fifteen TRIPs disputes in which the 
United States was the complainant, 80% of the disputes ended in a Mutually 
Agreed Solution.63  Based on the foregoing, TRIPs is not imperialistic, because an 
analysis of TRIPs’ DSM-related drafting history, DSU provisions, and application 
                                                                                                                                     
52 Id. 
53 DSU, supra note 16, art. 3, para. 7 (emphasis added). 
54 DSU, supra note 16, art. 5, para. 3. 
55 DSU, supra note 16, art. 5, para. 5. 
56 DSU, supra note 16, art. 5, para. 6. 
57 DSU, supra note 16, art. 23. 
58 DSU, supra note 16, art. 22. 
59 Id. 
60 Developing Countries’ Draft Agreement (W/71), supra note 35, art. 19. 
61 See TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX; TABLE 1, infra note 64. 
62 See TABLE 1, infra note 64. 
63 See TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX; see also TABLE 1, infra note 64. 
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of the mechanism, illustrates that the spirit of the developing countries’ draft 
agreement text subsists even through present-day application. 
 
TABLE 1 
TRIPs Disputes Resolved With a Mutually Agreed Solution64 
 
Dispute Year Complainant Respondent 
DS37 1996 U.S. Portugal 
DS28 1997 U.S. Japan 
DS36 1997 U.S. Pakistan 
DS42 1997 EC Japan 
DS86 1998 U.S. Sweden 
DS125 2001 U.S. Greece 
DS124 2001 U.S. EC 
DS83 2001 U.S. Denmark 
DS199 2001 U.S. Brazil 
DS196 2002 U.S. Argentina 
DS171 2002 U.S. Argentina 
DS115 2002 U.S. EC 
DS82 2002 U.S. Ireland 
 
B. TRIPs Stifles Special 301-type Unilateralism 
TRIPs is not imperialistic, because it stifles the United States’ ability to utilize 
Special 301, and thus empowers WTO-Member developing countries to challenge 
the United States and others without the looming threat of unilateral Special 301 
retaliation.65  An international agreement advocated by the West which decreases 
the West’s capabilities for unilateral retaliation is not imperialistic.  Such an 
agreement is not imperialistic because the reduction or elimination of unilateral 
political tools necessarily results in lessened opportunity for concentrated 
“extension or imposition of power, authority, or influence.”66 
                                                                                                                                     
64 For the data underlying TABLE 1, see TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX and accompanying 
notes. 
65 See generally Pechman, supra note 11, at 199–208 (noting the theoretical legal conflict 
between Special 301 and TRIPs).  This article attempts to highlight this conflict and, from it, 
infers that TRIPs is not imperialistic. 
66 See supra note 24. 
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In some ways, TRIPs might be viewed as a calculated risk on the United 
States’ part.  Indeed, it appears that the United States thought that the likelihood 
of high WTO accession rates and eventual TRIPs compliance would outweigh 
anything lost by TRIPs’ potential stifling of the United States’ ability to legally 
utilize Special 301.67  One commentator provides a clear description, explained 
briefly below, of the interplay between Special 301 and TRIPs—a framework that 
one might interpret as strong evidence that TRIPs is not imperialistic.68 
First, Special 301’s use against a WTO-Member nation for an alleged TRIPs 
violation would likely violate TRIPs, because TRIPs requires Members to invoke 
the DSM and not self-determine whether a violation has occurred.69  Second, 
TRIPs’ design arguably prevents the United States from using Special 301 to 
impose so-called TRIPs-plus standards on WTO Members, because TRIPs does 
not allow the United States to block panel formation or reports—something the 
United States had done under the previous GATT dispute model.70  Third, it is 
implicit that Special 301 cross-sector retaliation violates TRIPs, because TRIPs 
strongly suggests that retaliation must be in the same sector as the violation.71  
Lastly, if the United States cannot compel TRIPs compliance through the DSM—
because it allows compensation in lieu of compliance72—then the United States 
would have to resort to using Special 301.73  However, this would likely result in 
a TRIPs complaint against the United States.74 
The commentator’s analysis provides fertile ground for this article’s 
arguments.75  Because TRIPs’ DSM was shaped by the West, it represents a self-
induced reduction of the West’s ability to unilaterally influence the shape of 
WTO-Member nations’ intellectual property regimes—at least in terms of 
compliance.  Furthermore, because TRIPs’ DSM was shaped by the developing 
countries, it is a stakeholder-based, multilateral exercise of influence in response 
to, and in anticipation of, Special 301-type unilateral measures.76  Thus, TRIPs is 
                                                                                                                                     
67 See Pechman, supra note 11, at 199–210. 
68 See id.  
69 See id. at 202–03. 
70 See id. at 197–98.  For example, in 1987 the United States blocked Brazil’s attempt to form 
a GATT dispute settlement panel in response to the United States’ imposition of “100% tariffs on 
$39 million worth of Brazilian exports including paper products, drugs, and electronics” as a 
cross-sector Special 301 response to Brazil’s protection, or lack thereof, of pharmaceutical patents.  
Id. 
71 See Pechman, supra note 11, at 203–04. 
72 See DSU, supra note 16, art. 22, para. 1. 
73 See Pechman, supra note 11, at 204–08. 
74 See id.  
75 See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text. 
76 Special 301 may have even been a driving force behind developing countries’ TRIPs 
negotiations.  See Pechman, supra note 11, at 199 (quoting THOMAS O. BAYARD & KIMBERLY 
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not imperialistic, because both options illustrate that TRIPs’ DSM was not the 
result of an “extension or imposition of power, authority, or influence” by the 
West.77  The United States’ decision may generally be a wise investment for long-
term and widespread increases in intellectual property protection.78  If and when 
this occurs, TRIPs may bring two important benefits for the West: (1) it may 
externalize the resources previously exhausted by efforts like Special 301;79 and 
(2) it may enhance America’s image abroad and improve international trade 
relations generally due to the absence of cross-sector sanctions for intellectual 
property violations.80  The presence of these potential benefits for the West does 
not make TRIPs imperialistic, however, because the attainment of these benefits 
would benefit the world at large.  Lastly, Special 301 has not gone away 
entirely.81  As such, the West has not let go of all unilateral options—at least not 
those outside of TRIPs’ realm.82 
These TRIPs-era remnants of Special 301-type programs, however, do not 
signal defeat for this article.  Indeed, this article only asserts that TRIPs is not 
imperialistic—its arguments do not necessarily combat allegations that the West 
is imperialistic in other intellectual property contexts.  Of course, because TRIPs 
does not abolish what some may interpret as imperialistic actions outside of 
TRIPs’ realm, TRIPs might be viewed, in some respects, as a form of complicit or 
passive imperialism.  This argument fails, however, because imperialism requires 
active and deliberate steps—the “extension or imposition of power, authority, or 
influence.”83  Therefore, TRIPs is not imperialistic. 
                                                                                                                                     
ANN ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 207 (1994)) (stating that it 
appears plausible that the U.S.’s unilateralism “encouraged developing countries to negotiate on 
[intellectual property during TRIPs negotiations] as a way of establishing rules to restrain U.S. 
unilateralism”). 
77 See supra note 24. 
78 See Pechman, supra note 11, at 204–05. 
79 See id. at 204 (“[T]he United States wants to externalize its strong intellectual property 
protection by supporting a multilateral agreement that provides sufficient minimum standards of 
protection and adequate enforcement mechanisms.”). 
80 See Pechman, supra note 11, at 204 (“The retaliation limitations built into the DSU, 
coupled with the obligation of Members to utilize the DSU to deal with disputes arising under the 
WTO Agreements, imply that retaliation under Special 301 beyond the scope of the DSU violates 
the WTO Agreements.”).   
81 Indeed, it was not repealed after TRIPs was established.  Montén, supra note 27, at 403 
(citation omitted).  Moreover, it apparently remains available for (1) influencing conformance as 
countries accede and construct standards; and (2) retaliating against GATT non-Members.  See 
Pechman, supra note 11, at 199.   
82 See Pechman, supra note 11, at 199. 
83 See supra note 24. 
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IV.  TRIPS IS NOT IMPERIALISTIC, BECAUSE THIRD-PARTY 
PARTICIPATION IN THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS IS DIVERSE, 
EXTENSIVE, AND HAS INCREASED OVER TIME 
The design and application of TRIPs’ DSM is non-imperialistic, because 
strong empirical evidence supports that international third-party participation in 
such disputes is diverse, extensive, and has increased over the past thirteen years.  
An international dispute settlement process should allow multilateral participation 
and should provide all relevant global stakeholders a forum in which to cast their 
relevant opinions.  Indeed, unless this need is satisfied, the agreement’s terms 
would clearly be imperialistic in nature.  Mere design, however, is only the 
beginning.  If application of the agreement’s process fails to include diverse 
voices, and if the international community eschews the process because if feels 
ignored, then the agreement is clearly imperialistic.  Diverse participation means 
inclusion of parties with varied geographical locations, cultures, political 
structures, and economic power.  Extensive participation simply means that the 
process includes a relatively high percentage of relevant stakeholders.  In sum, the 
existence of diverse and widespread international participation in the process, and 
an increase of such participation over time, would be strong evidence of the 
treaty’s non-imperialistic design and application, and thus its success. 
TRIPs is not imperialistic, because third-party participation in its DSM is 
diverse and extensive.  At first glance, however, TRIPs’ DSM is a tool and a 
forum for the United States’ and the EC’s imposition of Western principles on 
other nations.84  Indeed, through a quick review of the complainant and 
respondent party names for each TRIPs dispute,85 one might infer that TRIPs is 
merely a venue for carrying out the West’s goals under the veil of TRIPs’ 
multilateral structure.  In fact, either the United States or the EC was the 
complainant in nineteen of twenty-five, or 75%, of all TRIPs complaints.86  Of 
those nineteen complaints, the United States was the complainant thirteen times.87  
Moreover, there is not a single case in which the United States or the EC was not 
either the complainant or respondent.88  Looking only at the complainant and 
respondent in each dispute, however, is not wholly illustrative.  Rather, one must 
dig deeper before labeling the system’s application as “imperialistic.” 
A closer look at TRIPs’ twenty-five complaints reveals that, when viewed as a 
whole, the body of disputes is only imperialistic on the surface.  First, in addition 
                                                                                                                                     
84 A link and full citation for all TRIPs disputes, including those listed in TABLE 1, is found in 
the TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX. 
85 See TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX. 
86 See TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX. 
87 See TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX. 
88 See TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX. 
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to naming the complainant and respondent in any given dispute, the WTO also 
names any countries that reserved third party rights.89  The table included at 
Appendix 1 contains a list of third party participation, if any, in each dispute.90  
As Appendix 1 shows, a third party joined a complaint in ten of twenty-five, or 
40%, of all TRIPs disputes.91  Within the ten complaints with third-party 
participation, a total of forty-nine countries participated.92  In particular, twenty-
three countries participated as individual entities, and twenty-seven countries 
participated under the auspices of the EC.93  Notably, Poland participated as an 
individual entity prior to joining the European Union in 2004, and also under the 
auspices of the EC in 2009.94  Poland is not counted twice, however, and the total 
number of participating countries is forty-nine.95  Remarkably, these forty-nine 
countries are from six distinct global regions: 
 
                                                                                                                                     
89 This information is available only by looking at each dispute individually.  See any note 
accompanying TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX for an example.  
90 See TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX. 
91 See TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX. 
92 See TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX. 
93 See TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX.  For various legal reasons, the European Union (EU) 
is known as the “European Communities” (EC) in WTO proceedings.  See World Trade 
Organization, The European Communities and the WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/ 
countries_e/european_communities_e.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2009) [hereinafter EC & the 
WTO].  All twenty-seven EU member states are individually WTO Members.  Id.  EU member 
nations are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  Id.  New EU 
members in 2004 were Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.  Id.  New EU members in 2007 were Bulgaria and 
Romania.  Id.  Notably, Switzerland and Poland are independently listed in TABLE 1 because 
Switzerland is not an EU/EC member, and Poland was not an EU member in 2000 when it joined 
as a third party in a TRIPs dispute.  Id.  See also TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX; TABLE 1, supra 
note 64. 
94 See EC & the WTO, supra note 93. 
95 See TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX. 
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TABLE 2 
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Therefore, although the group contains no African nations, it is nonetheless 
incredibly diverse.98  Indeed, a brief glance at Table 2 shows diversity in 
geographic location, culture, political structure, religion, and economic strength.99  
Moreover, over 32% of all WTO-Member nations have participated as a third 
party in a TRIPs dispute, as forty-nine of the 153 WTO-Member nations have 
reserved third-party rights individually or under the auspices of the EC.100  Lastly, 
in addition to the above-mentioned diversity and extensiveness of third-party 
participation in TRIPs’ dispute settlement process, TRIPs has become more 
“universal,” and thus less imperialistic over time.  As Table 3 illustrates, the 
number of “joins,” or instances in which a distinct third party joined a distinct 
TRIPs dispute as a third party in a given year, has steadily increased over the past 
thirteen years.  Thus, TRIPs is not imperialistic because strong empirical evidence 
                                                                                                                                     
96 For the data underlying TABLE 2, see TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX and accompanying 
notes. 
97 For a list of EC members, see EC & the WTO, supra note 93. 
98 For a list of the third-party countries, see TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX and TABLE 2, 
supra note 96. 
99 See U.S. Cent. Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).  For example, compare 
Cuba,  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html, (last visited Oct. 
15, 2009) with the United States, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2009). 
100 See TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX (identifying the countries that have participated as a 
third party in a TRIPs dispute); WTO, Member List, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2009) 
(identifying all WTO Members); EC & the WTO, supra note 93 (identifying all EC countries). 
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supports that third-party DSM participation is diverse, extensive, and has 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, TRIPs is not imperialistic for three reasons.  First, 
despite the nearly wholesale incorporation of the West’s DSM-related draft 
agreement provisions into Article 64 of TRIPs, it is evident that TRIPs’ drafting 
history, the resultant DSU, and the application of the DSU reflect the spirit of the 
developing countries’ draft agreement text.102  Second, TRIPs’ DSM stifles what 
some might consider unilateral and imperialistic measures: Special 301.103  
Finally, strong empirical evidence supports that TRIPs’ third-party DSM 
participation is diverse, extensive, and has increased over time.104 
 
                                                                                                                                     
101 If a party joined two distinct disputes in one year, it counts as two “joins.”  The EC counts 
as one party.  For data underlying TABLE 3, see TRIPS DISPUTES, infra APPENDIX and 
accompanying notes. 
102 See supra Part III.A. 
103 See supra Part III.B. 
104 See supra Part IV. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE OF ALL TRIPS DISPUTES 
1996–2009 
Dispute Date Third Parties  Complainant Respondent Area of Law 
DS37105  1996 None U.S. Portugal Patent 
DS28106  1997 None U.S. Japan Copyright 
DS36107  1997 None U.S. Pakistan Patent  
DS42108  1997 None EC Japan Copyright  
DS50109  1997 U.S. India EC Patent 
DS79110  1998 U.S. EC India Patent  
DS153111  1998 None Canada EC Patent  
DS86112  1998 None U.S. Sweden Enforcement
                                                                                                                                     
105 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Portugal—Patent Protection under the 
Industrial Property Act, WT/DS37 (Oct. 8, 1996), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ cases_e/ds37_e.htm.   
106 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Japan—Measures Concerning Sound 
Recordings, WT/DS28 (Feb. 5, 1997), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ ds28_e.htm.   
107 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Pakistan — Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS36 (March 7, 1997), available at 
http://www.wto. org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds36_e.htm. 
108 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Japan—Measures Concerning Sound 
Recordings Complainant, WT/DS42 (Nov. 17, 1997), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ dispu_e/cases_e/ds42_e.htm.   
109 Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Products, WT/DS50 (Dec. 19, 1997), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/cases_e/ds50_e.htm.   
110 Report of the Panel, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Products, WT/DS79 (Aug. 24, 1998), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ cases_e/ds79_e.htm.   
111 Request for Consultations by Canada, European Communities—Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS153 (Dec. 2, 1998), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds153_e.htm.   
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Dispute Date Third Parties  Complainant Respondent Area of Law 
DS186113  2000 None EC U.S. Tariff 







EC Canada Patent 




EC U.S. Copyright 
DS224116  2001 None Brazil U.S. Patent 
DS170117  2001 None U.S. Canada Patent 
DS125118  2001 None U.S. Greece Enforcement
DS124119  2001 None U.S. EC Enforcement
                                                                                                                                     
112 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Sweden—Measures Affecting the Enforcement 
of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS86/2 (Dec. 11,1998), available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds86_e.htm. 
113 Request for Consultations by the European Communities and their member States, United 
States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and Amendments thereto, WT/DS186/1 (Jan. 12, 
2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds186_e.htm.   
114 Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 
WT/DS114/13 (Aug. 18, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
cases_e/ds114_e.htm.   
115 Recourse to Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU, United States—Section 110(5) of the 
U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/ARB25/1  (Nov. 9, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds160_e.htm.   
116 Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States—US Patents Code, WT/DS224/1 (Feb. 
7, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds224_e.htm.   
117 Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes, Canada—Term of Patent Protection, WT/DS170/10 (Feb. 28, 2001), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds170_e.htm.   
118 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Greece— Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs, WT/DS125/2 (March 26, 2001), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds125_e.htm. 
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Dispute Date Third Parties  Complainant Respondent Area of Law 
DS83120  2001 None U.S. Denmark Enforcement





U.S. Brazil Patent 
DS196122  2002 None U.S. Argentina Patent 
DS171123  2002 None U.S. Argentina Patent  
DS115124  2002 None U.S. EC Copyright 
DS82125  2002 U.S. U.S. Ireland Copyright 
DS176126  2002 Japan; Nicaragua EC U.S. TM 
                                                                                                                                     
119 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, European Communities—Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs, WT/DS124/2 (March 
26, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds124_e.htm. 
120 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Denmark—Measures Affecting the Enforcement 
of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS83/2 (June 13, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds83_e.htm.  
121 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil—Measures Affecting Patent Protection, 
WT/DS199/4 (July 19, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ 
ds199_e.htm. 
122 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Argentina—Certain Measures on the Protection 
of Patents and Test Data, WT/DS196/4 (June 20, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds196_e.htm.   
123 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Argentina—Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceuticals and Test Data Protection for Agricultural Chemicals, WT/DS171/3 (June 20, 
2002), available at http://www. wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds171_e.htm.   
124 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, European Communities—Measures Affecting 
the Grant of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, WT/DS115/3 (Sept. 13, 2002), available at 
http:// www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds115_e.htm.   
125 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Ireland—Measures Affecting the Grant of 
Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, WT/DS82/3 (Sept. 13, 2002), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds82_e.htm. 
126 Appellate Body Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, 
WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
cases_e/ds176_e.htm.   
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Dispute Date Third Parties  Complainant Respondent Area of Law 










Australia EC TM and GIS 









U.S. EC TM and GIS 











                                                                                                                                     
127 Report of the Panel, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS290/R (March 15, 2005), available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds290_e.htm. 
128 Report of the Panel, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/R (March 15, 2005), available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds174_e.htm. 
129 Report of the Panel, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.wto.int/english/tratop_e/ dispu_e/362r_e.pdf. 
20
Cybaris®, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol1/iss1/6
